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Rewarding cooperation is in many ways expected behaviour from social players. However, strategies that
promote antisocial behaviour are also surprisingly common, not just in human societies, but also among euso-
cial insects and bacteria. Examples include sanctioning of individuals who behave prosocially, or rewarding of
freeriders who do not contribute to collective enterprises. We therefore study the public goods game with antiso-
cial and prosocial pool rewarding in order to determine the potential negative consequences on the effectiveness
of positive incentives to promote cooperation. Contrary to a naive expectation, we show that the ability of defec-
tors to distribute rewards to their like does not deter public cooperation as long as cooperators are able to do the
same. Even in the presence of antisocial rewarding the spatial selection for cooperation in evolutionary social
dilemmas is enhanced. Since the administration of rewards to either strategy requires a considerable degree
of aggregation, cooperators can enjoy the benefits of their prosocial contributions as well as the corresponding
rewards. Defectors when aggregated, on the other hand, can enjoy antisocial rewards, but due to their lack of
contributions to the public good they ultimately succumb to their inherent inability to secure a sustainable future.
Strategies that facilitate the aggregation of akin players, even if they seek to promote antisocial behaviour, thus
always enhance the long-term benefits of cooperation.
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1. Introduction
The sustainability of modern human societies relies on co-
operation among unrelated individuals [1]. Situations that re-
quire cooperative behaviour for socially beneficial outcomes
abound and range from taxpaying and voting to neighbour-
hood watch, recycling, and climate change mitigation [2–6].
The crux of the problem lies in the fact that, while coopera-
tion leads to group-beneficial outcomes, it is jeopardized by
selfish incentives to free-ride on the contributions of others.
Excessive short-term benefits to individuals who act as selfish
maximizers create systemic risks that may nullify the long-
term benefits of cooperation and lead to the tragedy of the
commons [7]. Fortunately, we have strong predispositions to
behave morally even when this in conflict with our material
interests [8]. The innate human drive to act prosocially is a
product of our evolution as a species, as well as our unique
capacity to internalise norms of social behaviour [9, 10]. Yet,
it is also important to note that impaired recognition and ab-
sent cognitive skills are likewise potential triggers of antiso-
cial rewarding, in particular since under such circumstances
the donor of the reward is likely to be unable to distinguish
between cheaters and cooperators. As such, the concepts of
mutualism and second-order free-riding are by no means lim-
ited to human societies, but apply just as well to certain euso-
cial insects as well as to bacterial societies [11].
Despite favourable predispositions, however, cooperation
is often subject to both positive and negative incentives [12–
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16]. Positive incentives typically entail rewards for behaving
prosocially [17–21], while negative incentives typically en-
tail punishing free-riding [22–30]. However, just like public
cooperation incurs a cost for the wellbeing of the common
good, so does the provisioning of rewards or sanctions incur
a cost for the benefit or harm of the recipients. Individuals
that abstain from dispensing such incentives therefore become
second-order freeriders [31], and they are widely believed to
be amongst the biggest impediments to the evolutionary sta-
bility of rewarding and punishing [32–36].
In addition to being costly, the success of positive and neg-
ative incentives is challenged by the fact that they can be ap-
plied to promote antisocial behaviour. Antisocial punishment,
that is, the sanctioning of group members who behave proso-
cially, is widespread across human societies [37]. Moreover,
antisocial rewarding is present in various inter-specific social
systems, where the host often rewards the parasitic species of
a symbiont [38]. This phenomenon is due to the inability of
the donor to distinguish defectors and cooperators. Recent
theoretical work also indicates that antisocial punishment can
prevent the coevolution of punishment and cooperation [39],
just like antisocial rewarding can lead to the breakdown of co-
operation if the latter is contingent on pool rewarding [40]. In
theory, the resolution of such social traps involves rather com-
plex set-ups, entailing the ability of second-order sanction-
ing, elevated levels of effectiveness of prosocial incentives in
comparison to antisocial incentives, or the decreased ability to
dispense antisocial incentives due to the limited production of
public goods in environments with low levels of cooperation.
Here we study what happens if both competing strategies
are able to invest into a rewarding pool to support akin play-
ers. How does such a strategy-neutral intervention influence
the evolutionary outcome of a public goods game? We con-
2sider a four-strategy game, where beside traditional coopera-
tors and defectors also rewarding cooperators and rewarding
defectors are present. Rewarding cooperators reward other re-
warding cooperators, while rewarding defectors reward other
rewarding defectors, thus representing prosocial and antiso-
cial pool rewarding, respectively. Noteworthy, our setup dif-
fers slightly from a recently studied model where rewarding
players could be utilized directly by non-rewarding competi-
tors [40]. In our case, however, we focus on the impact of the
strategy-neutral intervention in the form of pool rewarding. In
addition to the well-mixed game, we mainly study the game
in a structured population, where everybody does not interact
with everybody else, and the interactions that do exist are not
random [41–43]. The importance of structured populations
for the outcome of evolutionary social dilemmas was reported
first by Nowak and May [44], and today the positive effects
of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation are well-
known as network reciprocity [45, 46]. Several recent reviews
are devoted to evolutionary games in structured populations
[47–53].
The consideration of prosocial and antisocial pool reward-
ing in structured populations is thus an important step that
promises to elevate our understanding of the impact of strate-
gies that aim to promote antisocial behaviour in evolutionary
games. As we will show, antisocial rewarding does not hinder
the evolution of cooperation from a random state in structured
populations, and in conjunction with prosocial rewarding, it
still has positive consequences in that it promotes the spa-
tial selection for cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas.
This counterintuitive outcome can be understood through pat-
tern formation that facilitates the aggregation of players who
adopt the same strategies, which in turn helps to reveal the
long-term benefits of cooperation in structured populations.
2. Material and methods
The public goods game is a stylized model of situations that
require cooperation to achieve socially beneficial outcomes
despite obvious incentives to free-ride on the efforts of others.
We suppose that players form groups of size G = 5, where
they either contribute c = 1 or nothing to the common pool.
After the sum of all contributions is multiplied by the syn-
ergy factor r1 > 1, the resulting public goods are distributed
equally amongst all the group members irrespective of their
contribution to the common pool. In parallel to this traditional
version of the public goods game entailing cooperators (C)
and defectors (D), two additional strategies run an indepen-
dent pool rewarding scheme. These are rewarding cooperators
(RC ) and rewarding defectors (RD), who essentially establish
a union-like support to aid akin players. Accordingly, reward-
ing cooperators contribute c = 1 to the prosocial rewarding
pool. The sum of all contributions in this pool is subsequently
multiplied by the synergy factor r2 > 1, and the resulting
amount is distributed equally amongst all RC players in the
group. Likewise, at each instance of the public goods game all
rewarding defectors contribute c = 1 to the antisocial reward-
ing pool. The sum of all contributions in this pool is subse-
quently multiplied by the same synergy factor r2 > 1 that ap-
plies to the prosocial rewarding pool, and the resulting amount
is distributed equally amongst allRD players in the group. We
are thus focusing on the consequences of union-like support to
akin players, without considering second-order free-riding. It
is therefore important that we consider strategy-neutral pool
rewarding in that individual contributions to the prosocial and
the antisocial rewarding pool are the same (c = 1), as is the
multiplication factor r2 that is subsequently applied. Other-
wise, if an obvious disadvantage would be given to either the
prosocial or the antisocial rewarding pool, the outcome of the
game would become predictable. We also emphasize that, in
order to consider the synergistic consequence of mutual ef-
forts and to avoid self-rewarding of a lonely player [57], we
always apply r2 = 1 if only a single individual contributed to
the rewarding pool.
In addition to the well-mixed version of the game, we pri-
marily consider the spatial game. We emphasize that the im-
portance of a structured population is not restricted to human
societies, but applies just as well to bacterial societies, where
the interaction range is typically limited, especially in biofilms
and in vitro experiments [58, 59]. Biological mechanisms that
are responsible for the population being structured rather then
well-mixed typically include limited mobility, time and en-
ergy constrains, as well as cognitive preferences in humans
and higher mammals. In the corresponding model, the public
goods game is staged on a square lattice with periodic bound-
ary conditions where L2 players are arranged into overlapping
groups of size G = 5, such that everyone is connected to its
G − 1 nearest neighbours. Accordingly, each individual be-
longs to g = 1, . . . , G different groups. The square lattice is
the simplest of networks that allows us to take into account the
fact that the interactions among humans are inherently struc-
tured rather than well-mixed or random. Despite of its sim-
plicity, however, there exist ample evidence in support of the
fact that the square lattice suffices to reveal all the feasible
evolutionary outcomes for games that are governed by group
interactions [54, 55], and also that these outcomes are quali-
tatively independent of the details of the interaction structure
[51]. As an alternative, and to explore the robustness of our
findings, we nevertheless also consider regular small-world
networks, where a fraction Q of all links is randomly rewired
once before the start of the game [56].
The considered evolutionary game in a structured popula-
tion is studied by means of Monte Carlo simulations, which
are carried out as follows. Initially each player on site x is
designated either as a cooperator, defector, rewarding coop-
erator, or a rewarding defector with equal probability. Next,
the following elementary steps are iterated repeatedly until a
stationary solution is obtained. A randomly selected player
x plays the public goods game with its G − 1 partners as a
member of all the g = 1, . . . , G groups, whereby its overall
payoff Πsx is thus the sum of all the payoffs Πgsx acquired in
each individual group as described in the preceding subsec-
tion. Next, player x chooses one of its nearest neighbours at
random, and the chosen co-player y also acquires its payoff
Πsy in the same way. Finally, player x enforces its strategy sx
onto player y with a probability given by the Fermi function
3w(sx → sy) = 1/{1+exp[(Πsy−Πsx)/K]}, whereK = 0.5
quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [54], implying
that better performing players are readily adopted, although it
is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player perform-
ing worse. Such errors in decision making can be attributed to
mistakes and external influences that adversely affect the eval-
uation of the opponent. Each full Monte Carlo step (MCS)
gives a chance to every player to enforce its strategy onto one
of the neighbours once on average.
The average fractions of cooperators (fC), defectors (fD),
rewarding cooperators (fRC ), and rewarding defectors (fRD )
on the square lattice were determined in the stationary state
after a sufficiently long relaxation time. Depending on the
proximity to phase transition points and the typical size of
emerging spatial patterns, the linear system size was varied
from L = 400 to 1200, and the relaxation time was varied
from 104 to 105 MCS to ensure that the statistical error is
comparable with the line thickness in the figures.
3. Results
(a) Evolution in a well-mixed population
From the pairwise comparison of strategies it follows that
pool rewarding is dominant. Accordingly, the original 4-
strategy game can be reduced to a 2-strategy game, where
the RC and RD strategies compete. Designating by nRC the
number of rewarding cooperators and by nRD the number of
rewarding defectors among other players in a group, the pay-
offs of the two competing strategies are
ΠRD = r1
nRC
G
+ r2δ(RD)− 1 , (1)
ΠRC = r1
nRC + 1
G
− 1 + r2δ(RC)− 1 , (2)
where
δ(s) =
{
1 if ns > 0
1
r2
otherwise . (3)
By designating the fraction of RC players as x, the corre-
sponding replicator equation becomes
x˙ = x[PRC − (xPRC + (1 − x)PRD )] . (4)
Here
Ps =
∑
nRC ,nRD
(G− 1)!
nRC !nRD !
xnRC (1− x)nRDΠs , (5)
where 0 ≤ ns ≤ G−1 and
∑
ns = G−1 are always fulfilled.
Starting from a random initial state, where both compet-
ing strategies are equally common (xi = 0.5), the solution
of Eq. 4 indicates that the population will always terminate
into the full RD state if r1 < G, and this independently of
the value of r2. In other words, the introduction of strat-
egy neutral rewards cannot help cooperators if they are not
already predominant in the initial population. Accordingly,
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FIG. 1: In a well-mixed population, when both competing strategies
are initially equally common, the extinction of rewarding coopera-
tors is unavoidable if r1 < G, and this independently of the value
of r2. However, if RC players are initially in the majority, then a
new stable state emerges, where rewarding cooperators are the only
players remaining in the population. In this bistable case, the border
of the attractive basin depends sensitively on the initial fraction xi of
RC players. Lines in the figure show the border of the two basins,
as obtained for xi = 0.51, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9, from top to bot-
tom on the r1 − r2 parameter plane. The bottom-most dashed gray
line shows the border in the limiting case, when there is an infinites-
imally small minority of rewarding defectors initially present in the
well-mixed population.
the introduced rewards will not avert from the tragedy of the
commons when the competing strategies start the evolutionary
game equally strong.
However, if RC players are somehow able to aggregate,
then a significantly new situation emerges. This condition can
be reached by assuming xi > 0.5, when rewarding coopera-
tors form the majority in the initial population. In this case,
the full RC and the full RD state becomes an attractor point,
but the border of their basins depends sensitively on the val-
ues of xi. This effect is illustrated in Fig. 1, where we have
plotted the border of the two stable solutions on the r1 − r2
parameter plane.
(b) Evolution in a structured population
The lesson learned from the preceding subsection is that
rewarding cooperators should initially constitute the majority
of the population to survive. Otherwise, if their strength in
numbers is absent, rewarding defectors inevitably take over.
In a structured population, however, this special initial condi-
tion can spontaneously emerge locally, during the course of
evolution, without there being an obvious advantage given to
rewarding cooperators at the outset. The fundamental ques-
tion then is whether such a positive local solution is viable
and able to spread across the whole population, or rather if it
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FIG. 2: Phase diagram of the studied spatial public goods game,
demonstrating that the presence of antisocial rewarding does not hin-
der prosocial rewarding to promote cooperation. Depicted are strate-
gies that remain on the square lattice after sufficiently long relaxation
times as a function of the multiplication factor for the public goods
pool r1 and the multiplication factor for the antisocial and prosocial
rewarding pool r2. Solid blue lines denote continuous phase transi-
tions. Neither cooperators (C) nor defectors (D) who abstain from
participating in pool rewarding are able to survive in the stationary
state. Instead, for low values of r1 rewarding defectors (RD) dom-
inate, while for sufficiently high values of r1 and r2 rewarding co-
operators (RC ) prevail. In-between is a rather narrow two-strategy
RD + RC phase, where both rewarding strategies coexist. Interest-
ingly, for example at r1 = 3.5, increasing solely the value of r2 can
lead the population from a pure RD to a pure RC phase, thus indi-
cating clearly that rewarding, even if applied to both strategies, still
promotes cooperation.
is unstable and folds back to the defector-dominated state. To
clarify this, we perform systematic Monte Carlo simulations
to obtain the phase diagram for the whole r1 − r2 parameter
plane, as shown in Fig. 2. Before addressing the details, we
emphasize that the reported stationary states are highly stable
and fully independent of the initial conditions, which is a fun-
damental difference from the well-mixed solutions we have
reported above. Starting with the r2 = 1 line, which implies
the absence of pool rewarding, we note that cooperators sur-
vive only if the critical value of r1 is r1c > 3.74 [54]. The
fact that this value is still lower than the group size G = 5,
which would be the threshold in a well-mixed population, is
due to network reciprocity. The latter enables cooperators to
form compact clusters and so protect themselves against be-
ing wiped out by defectors [44]. Taking this as a reference
value, we can appreciate at a glance that, even in the presence
of antisocial rewarding, prosocial rewarding still promotes the
evolution of cooperation. However, neither defectors (D) nor
cooperators (C) who abstain from pool rewarding can survive
if r2 > 1. Indeed, as in the well-mixed case, only rewarding
defectors (RD) and rewarding cooperators (RC ) remain in the
stationary state, depending on the value of r1 and r2. This
outcome can be understood since players that do engage in
pool rewarding collect payoffs that exceed their initial contri-
butions to the rewarding pool.
In terms of the relation between RD and RC players, it
is interesting to note that the introduction of strategy-neutral
pool rewarding unambiguously supports the cooperative strat-
egy. In particular, as we increase the value of r2 and thus
increase also the efficiency of rewarding, the critical value of
r1 where RC players are able to survive decreases steadily.
Likewise decreasing is the r1 threshold for complete domi-
nance of the RD strategy. At specific values of r1, for exam-
ple at r1 = 3.5, it is even possible to go from the pure RD
phase to the pure RC phase solely by increasing the value of
r2. Thus indeed, even if the prosocial pool rewarding scheme
is accompanied by an equally effective antisocial pool reward-
ing scheme, in structured populations the evolution of coop-
eration from a neutral or even from an adverse initial state is
still promoted well past the boundaries imposed by network
reciprocity alone.
These results are different from those obtained with ran-
dom initial conditions in well-mixed populations, and they
are likely to appear contradictory because there is no obvi-
ous advantage given to cooperators over defectors as the value
of r2 increases. In fact, defectors benefit just as much given
that they run an identical pool rewarding scheme as coopera-
tors. So why is the evolution of cooperation promoted? The
answer is rooted in the possible aggregation of cooperators,
which can easily emerge spontaneously in a structured popu-
lation. It is therefore instructive to monitor the evolution of
the spatial distribution of strategies over time, as obtained for
different values of r2. Results are presented in Fig. 3, where
for clarity we have used a prepared initial state with only a
stripe of rewarding cooperators (blue) and rewarding defec-
tors (pale red) initially present, as it is illustrated in panel (f).
In all cases the synergy factor for the main public goods game
was set to r1 = 3.8.
The top row of Fig. 3 shows the evolution obtained at
r2 = 1, which corresponds to the traditional, reward-free pub-
lic goods game. It can be observed that the initially straight
interface separating the two competing strategies disintegrates
practically immediately. There is a very noticeable mixing of
the two strategies, which ultimately helps defectors to occupy
the larger part of the available space. Here cooperators are
able to survive solely due to network reciprocity, but at such
a relatively small value of r1 only small cooperative clusters
are sustainable. Nevertheless, we note that in a well-mixed
population defectors would wipe out all cooperators at such a
small value of the synergy factor.
Snapshots depicted in the middle row of Fig. 3 were ob-
tained at r2 = 1.3, where thus both antisocial and proso-
cial pool rewarding mechanisms are at work. Here the final
state is still a mixed RC + RD phase (see also Fig. 2), but
the fraction of cooperators is already significantly larger than
in the absence of rewarding. Larger cooperative clusters are
sustainable in the stationary state, which is due to an aug-
mented interfacial stability between competing domains. In
addition to traditional network reciprocity, clearly the forma-
tion of more compact cooperative clusters is further promoted
5k l m n o
f g h i j
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FIG. 3: Evolution of the spatial distribution of strategies over time reveals that, even in the presence of equally effective antisocial rewarding,
prosocial rewarding promotes the spatial selection for cooperation in the studied public goods game. Depicted are snapshots of the square
lattice over time from left to right, as obtained for r2 = 1 (top row), r2 = 1.3 (middle row), and r2 = 2 (bottom row). For clarity, we
have used a prepared initial state for all cases with only a stripe of rewarding cooperators (blue) and rewarding defectors (pale red) initially
present in the population, as depicted in panel (f). It can be observed that in the absence of rewarding (top row) the interface separating the
two competing strategies is broken easily, and network reciprocity alone can ultimately sustain only small cooperative clusters. However, as
the effectiveness of pool rewarding increases (middle and bottom row), the interface is strengthened, which makes the phalanx of cooperators
more effective. The latter helps to reveal the benefit of aggregated cooperators in structured populations. In all three cases the synergy factor
for the main public goods game is r1 = 3.8.
by the introduction of pool rewarding, and this despite the fact
that both antisocial and prosocial rewarding mechanisms are
equally strong.
If an even higher value of r2 is applied, the interface that
separates RC and RD players becomes impenetrable for de-
fectors. The two strategies do not mix at all, which maintains
the phalanx of cooperators [60]. Accordingly, the latter play-
ers simply spread into the region of defectors until they dom-
inate completely. This scenario is demonstrated in the bottom
row of Fig. 3, where the final stationary state is indeed a pure
RC phase.
As demonstrated in the middle and the bottom row of Fig. 3,
the introduction of pool rewarding supports the aggregation
of akin players and results in more stable interfaces between
competing domains. This fact enhances the positive impact of
network reciprocity further and provides an even more bene-
ficial condition for cooperation. This favourable consequence
of rewarding can be studied directly by monitoring how the
width w of the mixed zone – the stripe where both strategies
are present – evolves over time when the evolution starts from
the prepared initial state that is depicted in the panel (f) of
Fig. 3. According to the definition of the width of the mixed
zone,w = 0 in panel (j), while it becomesw = L in panels (e)
and (j). The inset of Fig. 4 shows how w increases in time for
different values of r2 increasing from top to the bottom curve.
Clearly, as the effectiveness of rewarding increases, the width
of the mixed zone increases slower and slower. While for low
values of r2 the width of the mixed zone increases until even-
tually it covers the whole population (see panel (e) of Fig. 3
for a demonstration), for sufficiently large values of r2 the
width remains finite, saturating and never exceeding a certain
threshold. This result provides quantitative evidence that the
interface between the two competing strategies remains intact,
and that in fact the compact phalanx of cooperators cannot be
broken by defectors. This in turn directly supports the evo-
lution of cooperation to the point where defectors are wiped
out completely, and this despite of the fact that they are able
support each other by means of antisocial rewarding.
Based on the results presented thus far, it is possible to pro-
vide a clear rationale why a strategy-neutral intervention, like
in this case the introduction of pool rewarding that at least in
principle ought to benefit cooperators and defectors equally, is
able to have such a biased impact on the final evolutionary out-
come. In particular, pool rewarding yields an additional pay-
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FIG. 4: Quantitative evidence in support of enhanced spatial selec-
tion for cooperation in the studied spatial public goods game with
antisocial and prosocial pool rewarding. The inset shows early stages
of the evolution of the width w of the mixed zone, where both strate-
gies are present after initially starting from a prepared initial state,
as depicted in panel (f) of Fig. 3. From top to bottom the curves
were obtained for r2 = 1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 2, and they
correspond to the average over 100 independent runs at system size
L × L = 100 × 100. In all cases the synergy factor for the main
public goods game is r1 = 3.8. The main panel shows the corre-
sponding increase in the fraction of rewarding cooperators fRC as
r2 increases, thus indicating that the favourable outcome is indeed
due to the enhanced stability of interfaces in structured populations.
This enables cooperators to dominate completely even at low values
of r1, where in well-mixed populations they would not be able to sur-
vive, and where based only on network reciprocity they would fare
poorly.
off to the players only if they aggregate and form at least partly
uniform groups. This is beneficial for cooperators because it
also helps them to obtain a competitive payoff from the origi-
nal public goods game. In other words, the long-term benefits
of cooperation come into full effect. The fate of defectors,
on the other hand, is under this assumption entirely differ-
ent. They can benefit from the antisocial rewarding scheme if
they aggregate into uniform groups, but then they are unable
to exploit the efforts of cooperators in the main public goods
game. If they do not aggregate, then the benefits from antiso-
cial rewarding become void. Either way, unlike cooperators,
defectors are unable to enjoy the rewards as well as maintain
a sustainable level of public goods. Ultimately, this favours
the evolution of cooperation even though the intervention on
the game is strategy neutral in that it does not favour one or
the other strategy directly by granting it a higher payoff. This
argument also explains why the same positive outcome is not
attainable from a random initial state in well-mixed popula-
tions, where it was concluded that the possibility of antisocial
rewarding utterly shatters any evolutionary benefits to cooper-
ators that might be stemming from prosocial rewards [40]. If
the interactions among players are well-mixed, then of course
neither cooperators nor defectors can aggregate locally, which
is a fundamental condition to reveal the long-term benefits of
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FIG. 5: Random rewiring enables defectors to enjoy the benefits of
antisocial rewarding and free-riding on the cooperative efforts of oth-
ers, but relatively healthy conditions for the evolution of cooperation
are maintained even if the randomness of the interaction network is
high. Depicted is the critical value of r1 = rc at which the popu-
lation arrives to a pure RD phase. It can be observed that rc values
increase steadily as Q increases, yet stay below the survival threshold
of cooperators in a well-mixed population even at Q = 1. The syn-
ergy factor for the antisocial and prosocial pool rewarding scheme
is r2 = 2. Qualitatively identical results are obtained also for other
values of r2.
cooperation in a collective enterprise, even if the population
contains strategies that seek to actively promote antisocial be-
haviour.
To corroborate our main arguments further, it is instructive
to consider the studied spatial public goods game on alterna-
tive interaction networks, in particularly on such where ran-
dom mixing can be controlled and adjusted deliberately. To
that effect, we randomly rewire a certain fraction Q of links
that constitute the originally considered square lattice, so that
for small values of Q we obtain a regular small-world net-
work, while in the Q → 1 limit we obtain a regular random
network, as described in [56]. Essentially, we thereby allow
players to expand the range of their interactions to players that
are well outside their local neighbourhood. In agreement with
the above-outlined arguments, this randomness in the inter-
action structure ought to prevent defectors from suffering the
negative consequences of aggregation with their like, thus al-
lowing them to further exploit the cooperative efforts of others
whilst still enjoying the benefits of antisocial pool rewarding.
We note that at high values of Q it is very likely that the direct
neighbours of any given player are not strongly connected.
The aggregation of players with the same strategies therefore
looses effect. Defectors who are members in one group can
also be members in completely different groups, where per-
haps the exploitation of cooperators is still possible. We test
this argument quantitatively in Fig. 5, where we show how the
critical synergy factor rc of the main public goods game for
which the population arrives to the pure RD phase increases
as Q increases. Indeed, as we increase the fraction of random
links, more and more defectors are able to enjoy the benefits
7of antisocial rewarding as well as the benefits of free-riding
on the cooperative efforts of others. As a countermeasure,
a higher synergy factor is needed to prevent defectors from
taking over. Nevertheless, even at Q = 1 the required value
of r1 is still below the survival threshold of cooperators in
a well-mixed population, and up to Q = 0.5, when half of
all the links are randomly rewired, there are still benefits to
strategy-neutral pool rewarding that go beyond those offered
solely by network reciprocity. We thus conclude that antiso-
cial rewarding does not deter public cooperation in structured
populations, even if the randomness of the interaction network
is high. Detrimental effects of strategies that seek to promote
antisocial behaviour appear to be significantly lessened if the
assumption of a well-mixed population is replaced by a struc-
tured population.
4. Discussion
We have studied the joint impact of antisocial and prosocial
pool rewarding in a public goods game, in particular focusing
on potential detrimental effects on the evolution of public co-
operation that may stem from strategies that seek to actively
promote antisocial behaviour. We have been motivated by
the fact that strategies that promote antisocial behaviour are
surprisingly common in human societies [37] and in various
inter-specific social systems [38], as well as by the fact that re-
cent research on a similar variant of the public goods game in
a well-mixed population has shown that antisocial rewarding
can lead to the breakdown of cooperation if the latter is con-
tingent on pool rewarding [40]. By considering akin-like pool
rewarding rather than peer rewarding, we also depart from the
mainstream efforts to study the effects of rewards in structured
populations [13, 20, 21], and join the recent [61–70] (and not
so recent [71]) trend in recognizing the importance of insti-
tutions for the delivery of positive and negative incentives to
cooperate in collective enterprises.
Our research reveals that, in structured populations, the
detrimental effects of antisocial rewarding are significantly
more benign than in well-mixed populations. Even if the in-
teraction network lacks local structure and has many long-
range links, and in this sense approaches conditions that one
might hope to adequately describe by a well-mixed popula-
tion, antisocial rewarding still fails to upset the effectiveness
of prosocial rewarding in promoting public cooperation. We
have shown that the rationale behind this rather surprising re-
sult is rooted in spatial pattern formation, and in particular in
the necessity of alike strategies to aggregate if they want to
enjoy the benefits of rewarding. While this condition is actu-
ally beneficial for cooperators because it helps them to obtain
a competitive payoff from the original public goods game, de-
fectors suffer significantly because they are no longer able to
free-ride on the cooperative efforts of others. The situation
for defectors is thus a lot like Sophie’s choice, in that they can
either enjoy the benefits of antisocial rewarding or the ben-
efits of free-riding on the public goods, but they can not do
both simultaneously. And just one of the two options is not
sufficient to grant them evolutionary superiority over cooper-
ators. Therefore, even in the presence of antisocial rewarding,
prosocial rewarding still offers benefits to cooperators that go
well beyond network reciprocity alone.
An interesting alternative interpretation of the studied pub-
lic goods game is to consider the introduction of antisocial and
prosocial pool rewarding as a strategy-neutral interference on
the original rules of the social dilemma [48]. We emphasize
that neither defectors nor cooperators gain an obvious evolu-
tionary advantage from the introduction of pool rewarding –
in fact, both strategies benefit exactly the same. It is there-
fore puzzling why, in the long run, cooperators turn out as the
favoured strategy. This is in fact different from what was re-
ported before for punishment, where available results indicate
that antisocial punishment prevents the coevolution of punish-
ment and cooperation [39], unless individuals have a reputa-
tion to lose [35], or if individuals have the freedom to leave
their group and become loners [72]. Nevertheless, the results
presented in our study add to the favourable aspects that pos-
itive incentives to promote cooperation have over negative in-
centives [17, 73]. The likely unwanted consequences of pun-
ishment are well know and include failure to lead to higher
total earning, damage to reputation, and invitation to retalia-
tion [17, 37, 74].
Summarizing, we have shown that antisocial rewarding
does not necessarily deter public cooperation in structured
populations, even if the randomness of the interaction network
is high. This is because the delivery of rewards is contingent
on the aggregation of alike strategies, which effectively pre-
vents defectors from free-riding on the public goods. At the
same time, the aggregation enhances the spatial selection for
cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas and thus helps to
expose the long-term benefits of cooperative behaviour.
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